Wold Food Crisis: Summary of the Summary by Jeremey Grantham/reproduced here from Morningstar website( link at bottom)
We are five years into a
severe global food crisis that is very unlikely to go away. It will
threaten poor countries with increased malnutrition and starvation and
even collapse. Resource squabbles and waves of food-induced migration
will threaten global stability and global growth. This threat is badly
underestimated by almost everybody and all institutions with the
possible exception of some military establishments.
Summary1. Last year we reported the data that
showed that we are 10 years into a paradigm shift or phase change from
falling resource prices into quite rapidly rising real prices.
2. It now appears that we are also about five years into a chronic
global food crisis that is unlikely to fade for many decades, at least
until the global population has considerably declined from its likely
peak of over nine billion in 2050.
3. The general assumption is that we need to increase food production
by 60% to 100% by 2050 to feed at least a modest sufficiency of
calories to all 9 billion+ people plus to deliver much more meat to the
rapidly increasing middle classes of the developing world.
4. It is also widely assumed that at least the lower end of this
target will be achieved. I believe that this is substantially
optimistic. At very best, if we reach that level we will not be able to
hold it. Much more likely, we will not come close because there are too
many factors that will make growth in food output increasingly difficult
where it used to be easy:
- Grain productivity has fallen decade by decade since 1970 from 3.5%
to 1.5%. Quite probably, the most efficient grain producers are
approaching a “glass ceiling” where further increases in productivity
per acre approach zero at the grain species’ limit (just as race horses
do not run materially faster now than in the 1920s). Remarkably,
investment in agricultural research has steadily fallen globally, as a
percent of GDP.
- Water problems will increase to a point where gains from increased
irrigation will be offset by the loss of underground water and the
salination of the soil.
- Persistent bad farming practices perpetuate land degradation, which
will continue to undermine our long-term sustainable productive
capacity.
- Incremental returns from increasing fertilizer use will steadily
decline on the margin for fertiliser use has increased five-fold in the
last 50 years and the easy pickings are behind us.
- There will be increased weather instability, notably floods and
droughts, but also steadily increasing heat. The last three years of
global weather were so bad that to draw three such years randomly would
have been a remote possibility. The climate is changing.
- The costs of fertiliser and fuel will rise rapidly.
5. Even if we could produce enough food globally to feed everyone
satisfactorily, the continued steady rise in the cost of inputs will
mean increasing numbers will not be able to afford the food we produce.
This is a key point that is often missed.
6. On the positive side, scientists are now very optimistic that they
will be able to engineer more efficient photosynthesising “C4” genes
(corn belongs to that family) into relatively inefficient but vital “C3”
plants such as rice and wheat, in 20 to 30 years. If successful this
would increase output up to 50% and would buy time for a less painful
transition to a sustainable population.
7. Many of these increasing difficulties were reflected in the
original 2008 food crisis and the 2011 rebound. The last six weeks’
price rise is more threatening because it occurred despite very much
larger plantings than were available in 2008. Global demand is now so
high and rising so fast and reserves are so low that price sensitivity
to weather setbacks has become extreme.
8. It seems likely that several countries dependent on foreign grain
imports have in fact never recovered from the 2008 shock. Countries like
Egypt saw the percent of their consumer budget for food rise to 40%. At
this level, social pressures may be at an extreme and probably have
already contributed to the Arab Spring. Any price increases from here
may cause social collapse and a wave of immigration on a scale never
before experienced in peacetime. Another doubling in grain prices would
be catastrophic.
9. Strong countermeasures to prevent a food crisis would be effective
in curtailing the current crisis and preventing the development of a
much greater crisis, but these measures will likely not be taken. This
is because the price signals for the rich countries are too weak – they
can afford the higher price – and there is inertia in all parts of the
system. Also, the problems of malnutrition in distant countries are not
generally felt as high-order priorities in the richer countries.
10. If food pressures recur and are reinforced by fuel price
increases, the risks of social collapse and global instability increase
to a point where they probably become the major source of international
confrontations. China is particularly concerned (even slightly
desperate) about resource scarcity, especially food.
11. The general public, the media, the financial markets and
governments badly underestimate these risks. Only the military of some
countries, including the US and the UK, seem to appreciate them
appropriately.
12. Natural gas supply increases buy some time, mainly for the US,
but seem more likely to create complacency and continued dependence on
hydrocarbons. The energy situation is less pressing globally in the
short term than is the food problem. Supplies are sufficient to cause
merely a slow and erratic price increase. The main problem with oil is
in its contribution to the food problem through higher farming costs and
generally increasing cost pressures on poorer countries.
13. In the longer term, in contrast, energy costs and absolute
shortage in the case of oil form a serious problem second only to food
shortages and will result in prices so high that they will impact global
growth and even the viability of modern, rather fragile, economies.
14. On paper, though, the energy problem can be relatively easily
addressed through very large investments in renewables and smart grids.
Those countries that do this will, in several decades, eventually emerge
with large advantages in lower marginal costs and in energy security.
Most countries including the US will not muster the political will to
overcome inertia, wishful thinking, and the enormous political power of
the energy interests to embark on these expensive programmes. They risk
being left behind in competiveness.
15. Availability of metals is, in contrast, a minor problem in the
next few decades. The prices will steadily rise but the consequences
will be less. In the long run though, metals are the most intractable
problem. There is no brain-intensive solution as there is for
agriculture (i.e., organic farming), nor is there any capital-intensive
or technology-intensive solution as there is for energy. We will just
slowly run out and prices will rise.
16. The results of these problems will be felt mainly as price
pressure in rich countries. The need to obtain adequate resources will
squeeze national budgets, profit margins and economic growth. For poor
countries, though, it is literally a matter of survival.
17. We are badly designed to deal with this problem: regrettably we
are not the efficient species of investment theory, but ill-informed,
manipulated, full of inertia and corruptible. Only once in a blue
moon—like World War II—do we perform anywhere near our theoretical
capabilities and this time the enemy is amorphous and delivers its
attack very, very slowly. But the stakes globally are very high indeed.
We must try harder.
18. The
following comments
on this topic are mine personally and reflect my Foundation’s portfolio
(and a total lack of career risk!). These comments are based on a time
horizon of 10 years and beyond. The portfolio investment implications
are that investors should expect resource stocks—those with resources in
the ground—to outperform over the next several decades as real prices
of the resources rise. Farming and forestry, though, are at the top of
the list. Serious long-term investors should have a very substantial
overweighting in a resource package. I suggest for long-term investors a
resource position of at least 30%. Another relative beneficiary of
resource pressure is the quality group of equities. Resources are a
smaller fraction of final sales than average and higher profit margins
make them more resilient to margin pressures.
19. Perhaps more importantly, the resource squeeze, coupled with
other growth-reducing factors (to be discussed next quarter), is likely
to reduce the return from the balance of the portfolio.
http://www.morningstar.co.uk/uk/news/articles/107679/Food-Crisis-Puts-Spotlight-on-Resource-Stocks.aspx